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Ven Countryman, Dean of the University of New Mexico Law School, has
edited this volume of opinions of Justice Douglas. It consists of a modest,
twenty-page biographical sketch of its subject and excerpts from sixty-nine
majority and dissenting opinions of the Justice's six hundred. The editing of the
opinions by Dean Countryman is the best job anyone has yet done in that
branch of esoterica; I speak as an expert, having done a less good job in this
respect in my own Mr. Justice Block, The Man and His Opinions, published
some ten years ago. Dean Countryman's essays on the cases, including their
settings and their consequences, have not been equalled by anyone who has
presented a particular Justice. The result is a brilliant adjunct to any constitutional law course.'
At the same time, Dean Countryman's portion of the work does not easily
lend itself to review, and is in any case less important than the Justice's. To
concentrate on what Countryman has done would be to review the frame of
the picture, and omit the real subject matter. It is more interesting to consider,
from this volume, what Mr. Justice Douglas himself thinks of the tasks he performs and the Constitution he interprets.
As to this there is only one proper source, and that is the Justice himself.
There will be a few variations of verbal detail to fit grammatical context, but
substantially everything in the remainder of this sketch comes from the words
of Mr. Justice Douglas as set forth in this volume.
I. WHERE THE JUSTICE STANDS

The policy of legislation, its wisdom, its needs, or the appropriateness of the
remedy chosen are no matters of judicial concern. Differences of opinion on
such scores are for Congress or the states; the Court does not sit as a super
legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy
which it expresses offends the public welfare. Even as to delegation of legislative power, whether a particular grant of authority to an officer or agency.is
wise or unwise raises questions not of judicial concern.
And yet ...

and yet ...

whereas usually, when Congress describes what job

must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority, it does not
abdicate its functions. Still, where activities or enjoyment, natural and often
necessary to the well being of the American citizen, such as travel, are involved,
the Court will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute
them. The delegation must never be unlimited; for law has reached its fnest
moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler,
some similar military official, some bureaucrat. Discretion is a ruthless master,
more destructive of freedom than any of man's other inventions.
IThe only lapse from excellence is Doubleday's--see the allusion, p. 170, to that well known
decision, Benjamin v. Cohen.
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In approaching his task, the judge must respect precedent without being
awed by it. One hesitates to overrule cases, even in the constitutional field, that
are of an old vintage; but the Court has always been willing to re-examine and
overrule constitutional precedents which history has shown had outlived their
usefulness or were conceived in error. Hence, for example, it is regrettable that
Eisner v. Macomber (taxability of stock dividends) dies a slow death; Douglas
thinks it should be overruled. So should Brown v. Walker (Fifth Amendment
inapplicable if immunity granted), and the view of the minority there should
be adopted. The decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States (control of aliens)
is inconsistent with our philosophy of constitutional law. Douglas would be rid
of United States v. General Electric Company (patents and price fixing), and he
does not believe that South Carolinav. United States (tax immunities of state
on proprietary activities) states the correct rule. Neither do the Sclzwimmer,
Macintosh and Bland (naturalization) cases. In this approach, the justice is at
his best in a case of first impression, one with no precedents to construe or principles previously expounded to apply. He loves to write on a clean slate.
This does not mean reckless innovation; the justice harkens to the lessons of
history. Among his predecessors he draws first and oftenest on Brandeis, as in
rate making (Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring); antitrust (where the lessons
Brandeis taught on the Curse of Bigness have largely been forgotten in high
places); on Brandeis the Justice in his classic statement of freedom of speech,
and on Brandeis the private citizen. Holmes is less of a household god; his pernicious dictum on the privilege of public employment gives a distortion to the
Bill of Rights.
And one learns from English and early American history, whether dealing
with an historic civil liberty like the right to trial by jury; or contempt of court
in the light of the experience of judge Peck; or from James Otis on the writs of
assistance; or the long history, traced to Lillbur and the Levellers, behind the
decision that the law should not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a
witness against himself.
And yet to Douglas the realities of a situation are more common mentors
than the history books. The necessity of broadly delegated powers depends on
the hard-headed practicality that Congress cannot otherwise perform its functions. In working out the relation of trespass and the old doctrine of usque ad
coelum, of course planes in the air lanes do not trespass; common sense revolts
at the idea. And in the antitrust field, choices must be made not on the basis
of abstractions but of the realities of modern industrial life. Such practical
considerations may occasionally trench even on basic values; for example, to
say that the military should have taken the time to weed out the loyal from
the disloyal Japanese-Americans at the beginning of World War II would be
to assume that the nation could have afforded to have them take the time to
do it.
This practical perception is most often used to sustain, not limit, individual
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rights. The fact that the very thought of a particular procedure is certain to
raise havoc with academic freedom is a reason for not permitting it, particularly
when youthful indiscretions, mistaken causes, misguided enthusiasms-all long
forgotten-will thereby become the ghosts of a harrowing present.
This is particularly true where basic civil liberties are involved which have
earned a preferred place under the Constitution. The paramount issue of the
age is to reconcile security and freedom, but this must be done with the preferred status always in mind-where civil liberties are infringed there is no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches. The vitality of civil and
political institutions in our society depends on free discussion.
II.

THm

NATuRE OF FREE SPEECH, AND

ITs LIMITATIONS

Freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance or unrest. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. The amendment itself is couched in absolute terms-freedom of
speech shall not be abridged. Because of this absolute status, which is a negation of power on the part of each and every department of government, speech
has had a preferred position as contrasted to some other civil rights. Free
speech, free press, free exercise of religion are placed separate and apart; they
are above and beyond the police powers; they are not subject to regulation in
the manner of factories, slums, apartment houses, production of oil and the like.
Full and free discussion is the first article of our faith. Free speech has
occupied an exalted position because of the high service it has given our society.
Its protection is essential to the very existence of a democracy. When ideas
compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the false
and they gain few adherents.
There are some limitations. Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and obloquy. Douglas would be willing to concede that such
conduct directed at a race or group in this country could be made an indictable
offense, for such a project would be more than the exercise of free speech. Like
picketing, it would be free speech plus. The teaching of methods of terror and
other seditious conduct should be beyond the pale, along with obscenity and
morality. Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that,
it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it. When
conditions are so critical that there will be no time to avoid the evil that the
speech threatens, it is time to call a halt. Yet free speech is the rule, not the
exception.
Over and over again Douglas stresses that the state is to punish deeds, not
thoughts or words. When the thought passes beyond discussion and becomes
action against the state, Douglas is fully prepared to be stern. He will not make
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justice truly blind to make the way easy for the traitor. Control of espionage
and sabotage may involve stern measures. Speech plus acts of sabotage or unlawful conduct can surely be punished. The school systems of the country need
not become cells for Communist activities, and the classrooms need not become
forums for propagandizing the 'Iarxist creed. But the guilt of the teacher must
turn on overt acts. Anyone who plots against the government and moves in
treasonable opposition to it can be punished. Douglas is by no means laggard
in giving such punishments.
III. OTma BAsic RiGnr s
The list of basic rights of a citizen, entitled to preferred status and vigilant
enforcement, is a long one. It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of
the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. The Federal
Loyalty Program violates a host of rights. The Loyalty Board conflicts on evidence which it cannot even appraise. The critical evidence may be the word of
an unknown witness who is "a paragon of veracity, a knave, or the village
idiot." His name, his reputation, his prejudices, his animosities, his trustworthiness are unknown both to the judge and to the accused. The accused has no
opportunity to show that the witness lied or was prejudiced or venal. Without
knowing who the accusers are, he has no way of defending.
Almost at the level of constitutional right is the privilege of being tried by
a jury of both men and women, for the truth is that the two sexes are not
fungible; the subtle interplay of influence of one on the other is among the imponderables. Far more basic as a safeguard against conviction and prosecution
and as a safeguard of conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression
as well is the freedom from self-incrimination. Also vital is the right to counsel
both at the trial and the pretrial stage, for a defendant desperately needs a
lawyer to help extricate him if he is innocent. In protecting against unlawful
searches and seizures, the Court should throw its weight on the side of the
citizen and against the lawless police. And above all, in the realm of procedure,
the historic writ of habeas corpus is one of the basic safeguards of personal
liberty. The statutes governing its use must be generously construed if the great
office of the writ is not to be impaired.
At the same time Douglas recognizes other less conventional but equally
basic rights. He regards the right of privacy as one of the unique values of our
civilization. Liberty as used in the Fifth Amendment must include privacy as
well if it is to be a repository of freedom. Even more important is the right to
work, the most precious liberty that man possesses. Man has as much right to
work as he has to live, to be free, to own property. Immediately connected with
both of these--i.e. the right to be let alone and the right to work-is the right
to be free of wrongful deportation, for deportation visits a great hardship on
the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

land of freedom. The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizens cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers
as well, is a part of our heritage.
just below these basic liberties in the Douglas hierarchy is freedom of competition. He is against having little, independent units gobbled up by bigger
ones. Such power as that of the United States Steel Company, for example, can
be benign, or it can be dangerous; it should not exist. A company such as that,
with its tremendous leverage on our economy, is big enough. It is bad for the
country to allow the independents to be swallowed up by absentee owners.
There follows a serious loss of citizenship. He who is a leader in the village becomes dependent on outsiders for his action and policy. Clerks responsible to a superior in a distant place take the place of resident proprietors
beholden to no one. And so whenever he can, Douglas would resolve the
ambiguities of the antitrust laws in favor of the maintenance of free enterprise.
This is particularly true in the patent field, where he would harmonize the
statutes as closely as possible with the policy of the antitrust laws.
IV. ThM PoWER To GovERN
Douglas wants power in the hands of the elected representatives of the
people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. If that power is in the hands
of such elected representatives, and if it is not used to restrict basic liberties,
then Douglas is prepared to give government all the power it practically needs.
For example, price control is one of the means available to the states and to the
Congress in their respective domains for the protection and promotion of the
welfare of the economy. Douglas came to the Court as a consequence of the
political revolution of the depression, and he certainly believes that Congress
under the Commerce Clause can deal with what it considers to be dire consequences of laissez-faire. The police power of the states extends to all the great
public needs. Fundamentally both Congress and the states have a broad and
inclusive power to promote the public welfare which includes values spiritual,
physical, esthetic, and monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
There remains the problem of the system of administration under which
these objectives are to be achieved, and here the great problem of federalism is
one in which the interest of the Justice is less than passionate. The foremost
problem is the practical one of effectiveness. Thus, in the problem of federal
taxation of state money-making activities, he believes the fear of depriving the
national government of revenue if the tax immunity of the state is sustained is
an idle spectre. He believes that expanding state activity holds no prospect of
crippling the federal government in its search for needed revenues, and so he
would uphold the states.
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V. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, AND WAYS OF USING IT
A portion of Douglas's force and effectiveness is in his manner of expression.
As the only regularly best selling author ever to sit on the Supreme bench, he
gives to his judicial work much of the same flair which he displays in the book
stalls. This includes the power to emphasize with brevity as in the Steel case
where he said, "Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a
wage increase and to keep the steel furnaces in production. Yet tomorrow another President might use the same power to prevent a wage increase, to curb
trade unionists, to regiment labor as oppressively as industry thinks it has been
regimented by this seizure."
When the case is in the criminal law and turns on simple facts, Douglas
makes the story vivid, as for example, in the case of a confession obtained from
a fifteen year old Negro boy after an all night interrogation. Douglas observed,
"Age fifteen is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be
judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a
man cold and unimpressed can overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is a
period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces... Mature
men possibly might stand the ordeal from midnight to five a.m. But we cannot
believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest. He
needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then
of panic."
Douglas often makes his point with a single sentence. Referring to community standards as a test of obscenity, he said, "It creates a regime where in the
battle between the literati and the Philistines, the Philistines are certain to
win." Or of the Communists, "In America they are miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold." Or of the exclusion of a doctor from
the practice of his profession in New York, "When a doctor cannot save lives
in America because he is opposed to Franco in Spain, it is time to call a halt
and look critically at the neurosis that has possessed us."
CONCLUSION

Dean Countryman has quarried from his immense mine of manuscript much
which it is good for us to have. The sight which emerges is of a justice who
has never lost his courage. It should give renewed courage to the faint-hearted
among us and renewed inspiration to those already brave.
* Member of the Arizona Bar.
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